Wow, this was great, and I found myself agreeing with everything you said! And so much of this applies to how Democrats have operated in other very red states such as Montana (Alani Bankhead, the Democratic Senate candidate this year, is an awful fit for the state).
Yep! The piece is about the 2026 runoff, but I wanted to use it to begin to craft a theory of Democratic defeat that could be applied more generally. I imagine there are other states where Democrats have taken a similar route to OKDems where one could see similarly dramatic shifts that are clearly independent of cohort change.
Brayden, I have a random question for you, since your knowledge of Oklahoma politics is second to none. In your view, how did Kendra Horn flip OK-5 back in 2018?
It remains my favorite upset to this day, but I never sensed that Horn was an exceptional candidate (or that her opponent was weak, which he wasn't). Was it maybe just that Oklahoma City voters finally started behaving more like other urban/suburban voters in 2018?
I haven’t done a deep dive on that particular election, but I think your instinct is pretty much right. The 2018 was a year of significant re-alignment for the OK Dems. As you can see in the chart “The Urban Party,” it was the first year in Oklahoma history that the Democratic primary electorate matched Oklahoma’s urban share.
I think one problem that the OK Dems have run into since her win (and one reason why I didn't discuss it in the article) is that the 2018 flip was truly exceptional. I think that Horn's win has given some Democrats the false idea that they can just bet on urbanization to turn Oklahoma blue.
You are right though. It's an interesting election that deserves its own treatment. There's definitely a story to be told there about why Horn could win in '18 but not in '20—and I imagine a lot of it is buried in precinct-by-precinct turnout data.
Wow, this was great, and I found myself agreeing with everything you said! And so much of this applies to how Democrats have operated in other very red states such as Montana (Alani Bankhead, the Democratic Senate candidate this year, is an awful fit for the state).
Yep! The piece is about the 2026 runoff, but I wanted to use it to begin to craft a theory of Democratic defeat that could be applied more generally. I imagine there are other states where Democrats have taken a similar route to OKDems where one could see similarly dramatic shifts that are clearly independent of cohort change.
Brayden, I have a random question for you, since your knowledge of Oklahoma politics is second to none. In your view, how did Kendra Horn flip OK-5 back in 2018?
It remains my favorite upset to this day, but I never sensed that Horn was an exceptional candidate (or that her opponent was weak, which he wasn't). Was it maybe just that Oklahoma City voters finally started behaving more like other urban/suburban voters in 2018?
I haven’t done a deep dive on that particular election, but I think your instinct is pretty much right. The 2018 was a year of significant re-alignment for the OK Dems. As you can see in the chart “The Urban Party,” it was the first year in Oklahoma history that the Democratic primary electorate matched Oklahoma’s urban share.
I think one problem that the OK Dems have run into since her win (and one reason why I didn't discuss it in the article) is that the 2018 flip was truly exceptional. I think that Horn's win has given some Democrats the false idea that they can just bet on urbanization to turn Oklahoma blue.
You are right though. It's an interesting election that deserves its own treatment. There's definitely a story to be told there about why Horn could win in '18 but not in '20—and I imagine a lot of it is buried in precinct-by-precinct turnout data.
Thank you so much for your thoughtful reply! Astute as ever. :)
I must say, your Substack has become one my favorites in just the last few weeks. Can't wait for your next post!